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Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s enigmatic leader, 
came to power in 1998 by trumping the two 
political parties that had dominated the gov-
ernment for years. This amounted to quite a 
reversal of fortune: in 1992, as an army offi -
cer, he had led a failed coup attempt that 
landed him in prison. 
Chávez campaigned for the offi ce without 
any clear ideology other than hostility to the 
existing regime and its institutionalized cor-
ruption. Indeed, back in 1998, many wrote 
him off as an all-too-familiar phenomenon in 
Latin America – either a populist who would 
soon run out of money or another outsider 
who would become a caudillo corrupted by 
the opportunities of power. As things turned 
out, both views were far off the mark. 
In a country where wealth is displayed os-
tentatiously and millions live in bitter pov-
erty, Chávez was able to win the presidency 
because he promised the masses a series of so-
cial benefi ts to be fi nanced through the diver-
sion of oil revenues from foreign oil compa-
nies and the country’s domestic elite. But 
Chavistanomics is continually evolving. 
It is a variant on the old theme of Latin 
b y  r o b e r t  l o o n e y
I was overwhelmed by the feeling that I had just been 
traveling and chatting pleasantly with two opposing men. One to whom the caprices of 
fate had given an opportunity to save his country. The other, an illusionist, who could 
pass into the history books as just another despot. – Gabriel García Márquez
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American structuralism in that it attempts to 
shape the country’s economic structure 
through non-price incentives, and clearly 
represents an alternative to the free-market, 
free-trade policies of the so-called Washing-
ton Consensus that dominates thinking at the 
International Monetary Fund and other es-
tablishment institutions. But, with time, 
Chavistanomics has changed in ways that re-
fl ect the country’s shifting economic con-
straints as well as its evolving politics. It is 
now closely identifi ed with both anti-global-
ization and Latin American nationalism.
no one writes to the president
Like many other Latin American strongmen 
with a populist bent, Chávez has a distinct 
penchant for plebiscites. In the two years after 
taking offi ce, he called for fi ve separate votes: 
one to convoke a new constituent assembly to 
rewrite the constitution; another to elect 
members of that assembly; a third to win ap-
proval for the charter it produced; a fourth to 
hold new elections for president, governors 
and mayors; and fi fth, to dismantle the insti-
tutions of the existing labor movement. 
In the process, Chávez replaced a two-
party Congress with one overwhelmingly 
dominated by his supporters, and rewrote the 
constitution to allow him to serve for six years 
(up from fi ve) and to run for consecutive 
terms. The spate of elections also replaced the 
traditional political landscape with a cadre of 
governors and mayors largely of the presi-
dent’s own choosing. 
A brief digression is needed here. For 
much of the fi rst half of the 20th century, 
Venezuela was perhaps the Latin American 
country most severely affl icted by the disease 
of militarism. Indeed, Simon Bolivar once re-
ferred to his own country as a “barracks.” In 
1958, the founders of Venezuela’s Fourth Re-
public struck a bargain with the generals. In 
exchange for their permanent retirement 
from the political arena including even the 
surrender of their voting rights, the armed 
forces were given salaries, fringe benefi ts and 
other privileges far surpassing those of other 
vested interest groups. This arrangement, a 
commendably pragmatic solution to a chronic 
problem, was fi nanced by the country’s mush-
rooming oil revenues. 
But Chávez had no use for this grand ar-
rangement. Lacking a true party of his own, 
he decided to rely upon the military for key 
administrative tasks. Under Plan Bolivar 2000, 
vast amounts of money were entrusted to 
serving offi cers to oversee the construction or 
renovation of schools, clinics, roads and pri-
vate housing. Unfortunately, except for the 
Corps of Engineers, few Venezuelan offi cers 
had any experience in such work. 
In the years since, many high-level offi cers 
have expressed deep concern over the sudden 
shift in roles and the potential for corruption 
– no bidding process is involved in funding – 
although corruption may have been exactly 
what Chávez had in mind. The plan bought 
him political support from the military by 
creating a new patronage system. And it made 
the offi cer corps complicit in corruption, pro-
viding him with the means to blackmail his 
uniformed associates in the event they be-
came tempted to turn against him. 
More fundamentally, Chávez replaced Ven-
ezuela’s pluralist democracy, however fl awed, 
with a political system that revolves around 
him. 
While the traditional parties of the old re-
gime, particularly the once-dominant Accion 
Democratica, have not been completely ex-
tinguished, they are no longer a force. Chávez’s 
own Movimiento Quinta Republica is less a 
party than a loose coalition of people who for 
one reason or another expect to get ahead by 
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piggybacking on his immense popularity. 
Under Chávez, the country has experi-
enced a marked deterioration in economic 
freedom. Venezuela is now one of the world’s 
least economically free countries, ranking 
144th out of 165 worldwide and 28th out of 
29 in the Americas on the Heritage Founda-
tion’s Index of Economic Freedom. Its com-
mercial regulation is burdensome and con-
fusing. Its judiciary is heavily infl uenced by 
the government and does not enforce con-
tracts well. The labor market is rigid, and the 
fi nancial market, though sophisticated, has 
become more vulnerable to political interfer-
ence. Corruption pervades the civil service 
and, in tandem with the fear of expropriation, 
helps to deter foreign direct investment. With 
much of the authority of the central bank 
usurped, infl ation has soared. 
In the main indices of governance calcu-
lated by the World Bank, deterioration has 
been most striking in political stability, 
Chávez’s own Movimiento 
Quinta Republica is less 
a party than a loose 
coalition of people 
who for one reason or 
another expect to get 
ahead by piggybacking 
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followed by the rule of law, regulatory quality, 
control of corruption, and voice and account-
ability. While there has been an improvement 
in effectiveness of government under Chávez 
(which isn’t saying much since pre-Chavez 
governments weren’t known for their compe-
tence), Venezuela still ranks only in the 23rd 
percentile.
governance in a time of 
high oil prices
Chávez is staking his regime – and the prom-
ise he represents for ordinary people – on two 
premises. The fi rst is that the price of oil, 
which, fortuitously, has increased dramati-
cally since the president took offi ce, will re-
main at its present level or even edge upward 
in coming decades. The second is that the 
government will be able to use the windfall to 
build a productive non-oil economy. 
Chávez supporters contend that the redi-
rection of oil money is already transforming 
the lives of the poor. But critics, including se-
nior economic offi cials who have broken 
ranks with Chávez, say the money is being 
frittered away on consumption that boosts 
Chávez’s popularity, rather than being in-
vested in social and economic infrastructure. 
Even planners loyal to Chávez worry that, 
without strict oversight, a good portion of the 
money is being lost to corruption, and that 
little is being saved for the rainy day when oil 
prices fall.
It is very diffi cult to get an objective assess-
ment of Chávez’s short-term economic ac-
complishments. Data from the country’s Na-
tional Statistics Institute show unemploy-
ment has dropped from 16.6 percent when 
Chávez took offi ce to 10.2 percent in 2006. 
However, critics contend that unemployment 
is minimized by arbitrarily defi ning “infor-
mal” workers, such as street vendors and 
adults participating in government-spon-
sored educational programs, as employed. 
In 2004, the Institute released fi gures 
showing poverty had risen more than 10 per-
centage points under Chávez. But the agency 
effectively backtracked after a stinging cri-
t r e n d s
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tique by the president, creating a “social well-
being” index suggesting that poverty – now 
defi ned as people unable to afford basic food 
and services – had fallen.
Perhaps the most controversial of Chávez’s 
initiatives are the vast array of social pro-
grams and services known as missiones. There 
are currently some 20 such social missiones in 
Venezuela, offering a diverse menu of social 
services in the fi elds of education, health, nu-
trition, environmental protection, sports, cul-

















Critics say the money is being 
frittered away on consumption that 
boosts Chávez’s popularity, rather 
than being invested in social and 
economic infrastructure.
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funded from the government’s central budget 
and allocations from the state oil company, 
PDVSA, and function primarily through a 
parallel social service system that is not a part 
of the traditional state bureaucracy. The pop-
ularity of the missiones was instrumental to 
Chávez’s re-election in December 2006, and 
has been a major factor in cementing the 
president’s support among the poor. 
In principle, the missiones provide an inte-
grated package of poverty-reduction mea-
sures. As such, they are potentially more ef-
fective alternatives to the simple cash trans-
fers that have been the primary basis for pov-
erty-alleviation programs in Latin America.
But a case can be made that the work of 
the missiones should be integrated into exist-
ing ministries and institutions in order to in-
stitutionalize good government and program 
oversight. The missiones also tend to focus on 
alleviating the harsh conditions associated 
with poverty, rather than addressing the 
structural roots. This reality has led to wide-
spread criticism that they are paternalistic 
and create permanent dependence on the 
state. 
Sustainability is also a major practical con-
cern. Since the missiones are funded primarily 
from oil revenues, most would likely be cut 
back if oil revenue declined. And here, two 
factors come into play: future oil prices and 
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Objective forecasts of the global oil market 
clash with the optimistic assumptions of 
Chavistanomics. The widely respected Cam-
bridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) is 
projecting that world petroleum supplies will 
expand faster than demand over the next fi ve 
years. (This forecast does not rely on fortu-
itous new discoveries but, rather, is based on 
an analysis oil fi eld by oil fi eld.) As the supply 
grows, CERA expects prices will fall in the 
middle-term, possibly below $40 a barrel. 
“We expect supply to outpace demand growth 
in the next few years, which would take the 
pressure off prices around 2007-2008 or 
thereafter, and even lead to a period of price 
weakness,” concludes Peter Jackson, a co-au-
thor of the report. 
The projected increase in supply follows 
from the fact that higher prices are justifying 
the use of expensive technologies to wring 
more oil from older fi elds. According to the 
report, approximately 20 to 30 major proj-
ects, defi ned as those producing more than 
75,000 barrels per day, will come onstream 
every year until 2010. As a result, we can ex-
pect global supply to increase by 3 million to 
4 million daily barrels (the somewhat awk-
ward terminology of the oil business) each 
year.
While world oil production is set to ex-
pand more rapidly than demand over the 
next several years, Venezuela will have a hard 
time simply maintaining production at to-
day’s levels. That’s because PDVSA, Venezue-
la’s state oil company, is in no position to 
undertake major oil fi eld development. 
While it enjoyed an enviable reputation for 
technical competence during the 1980s and 
1990s, PDVSA emerged as a focal point of op-
position after Chávez was fi rst elected in 
1998. In 2002, PDVSA offi cials backed a gen-
eral strike aimed at toppling Chávez, bringing 
daily oil production from 3.3 million barrels 
to a near trickle of 700,000 barrels. Chávez 
broke the strike and then retaliated by fi ring 
19,500 veteran PDVSA employees, roughly 
half the fi rm’s workforce.
Today, employment exceeds pre-strike lev-
els, and Venezuela claims to be producing 3.3 
million barrels of oil per day. However, the 
International Energy Agency in Paris puts 
current production at 2.4 million barrels, and 
analysts say PDVSA continues to suffer the 
lingering effects of its recent political battles. 
Indeed, the company’s crash effort to recoup 
lost production after the strike may have 
damaged the country’s underground oil res-
ervoirs in ways that will hasten future pro-
duction declines.
Complicating PDVSA’s troubles is its 
struggle to cope with responsibilities that go 
far beyond the oil business. Because Chávez 
taps the state-owned giant to fi nance an array 
of social programs at home and to cement his 
regional infl uence through subsidized oil ex-
ports to allies such as Cuba and Bolivia, the 
company’s fi nances are severely stretched. 
Just to maintain current production, PDVSA 
must invest $3 billion annually in its aging 
fi elds. But Chávez has drained PDVSA’s 
The popularity of the missiones was instrumental 
to Chávez’s reelection in December 2006, and has 
been a major factor in cementing the president’s 
support among the poor.
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coffers to fund generous health, education, 
literacy and food programs, leaving insuffi -
cient cash for its core operations. Further-
more, the company’s obligations to the poor 
appear to be mushrooming: PDVSA recently 
disclosed that it spent $13.3 billion last year 
on social programs, almost twice as much as 
in 2005. 
Instead of selling more oil on global mar-
kets during a period of record world prices, 
Chávez is using increasing amounts of PDVSA 
oil in barter with Caribbean and Central 
American countries that is designed to boost 
his regional clout. Some of his political allies 
pay for discounted oil with bananas or sugar; 
the Cubans, who receive nearly 100,000 bar-
rels per day, send doctors to treat the poor.
Incredibly, at a time of $60-a-barrel-oil, 
PDVSA’s net income in 2006 year fell 26 per-
cent to $4.8 billion on $101 billion in revenue. 
By way of comparison, Norway’s state-run oil 
company, Statoil, was twice as profi table dur-
ing the same period in terms of the ratio of 
net income to revenue. In April 2007, PDVSA 
was forced to fl oat $7.5 billion in bonds to fi -
nance planned expansion of daily production 
to 5.8 million barrels by 2012, a fi gure no one 
outside the Chávez administration believes 
will be attained. 
one hundred years of socialism?
The abrupt shift in Chávez’s economic poli-
cies following his landslide December 2006 
re-election has only compounded PDVSA’s fi -
nancial problems. When Chávez came to 
power in 1998, he cited UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair as a role model. Chávez’s “third 
way” initially emphasized respect for private 
property and free markets, rejecting “com-
munist” approaches by looking to state inter-
vention only when the market failed. But 
Chávez’s views have since moved left, with the 
drift from European-style social democracy 
to utopian socialism accelerating over the 
past two years. 
Chávez fi rst revealed his plans for “21st 
Century Socialism” in 2005 at the World So-
cial Forum, the anti-globalization meetings 
held as a counterpoint to the establishmen-
tarian World Economic Forum in Davos. 
However, he never got beyond generalities, 
even during the presidential election cam-
paign of 2006 when it was a key component 
of Chávez’s election program. 
The meaning of 21st Century Socialism 
and proposed methods of achieving it have 
been made clearer in the months since. The 
planned changes will reshape the economy, at 
the cost of heightened dependence on oil ex-
port revenues. The proposals call for a signifi -
cant redistribution of political power to the 
grassroots, although skeptics see an authori-
tarian trajectory – echoes of Lenin’s dictator-
ship of the proletariat – in getting from here 
to there. 
Plans include the revocation of central 
bank autonomy and the elimination of bank 
reserve requirements, as well as an end to 
term limits for the president. More generally, 
state control will be reasserted in strategically 
important areas of the economy, including 
This surge in weapons acquisitions will only 
spawn a follow-on set of service and spare parts 
costs, placing further stress on future budgets.
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telecommunications, electricity and gas, and 
projects to develop the country’s vast deposits 
of tar-like “heavy” oil. Although private com-
panies will be allowed to retain minority 
stakes in this diffi cult-to-exploit raw material, 
PDVSA will control production and refi ning.
A new “geometry of power” will replace 
the functions of municipal and regional gov-
ernment with new “socialist cities,” based on 
federations of councils of “communal power.” 
The councils were fi rst introduced in April 
2006, and there are now approximately 13,000 
across the country, typically involving 200-
400 families. 
Through this model of “direct democracy,” 
local communities are essentially self-govern-
ing, identifying their own welfare, education 
and employment needs. The $1 billion in 
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2006 will rise to $5 billion this year.
Fifteen new state ministries have also been 
created, bringing the total to 27. Most are 
drawn from Chávez’s own MVR party, have 
in the past been associated with the radical 
left, and are now in the vanguard of efforts to 
accelerate Venezuela’s divergence from the 
economic and political mainstream. On tak-
ing offi ce, they swore to “never rest arm or 
soul in the construction of the Venezuelan 
path toward socialism.”
Many aspects of the announced changes 
remain vague: for example, the framework for 
nationalization has not been elaborated. An-
other area of concern is the country’s new en-
thusiasm for arming the military. Venezuela 
has spent more than $4 billion on weapons 
over the last two years, making it Latin Amer-
ica’s largest weapons buyer and placing it 
ahead of other major global arms importers 
including Pakistan and Iran. This surge in 
weapons acquisitions will spawn a follow-on 
set of service and spare parts costs, placing 
further stress on future budgets.
The grandiosity of Chavez’s vision and the 
lack of constitutional checks on his power 
make it diffi cult to predict how Chavez will 
respond to bumps along the road – or, for 
that matter, to the possible cliff at the end. A 
lot will depend on who Chávez becomes in 
his next incarnation. 
Will he evolve in the image of Juan Perón, 
the con man who crippled the wealth-creat-
ing institutions of Argentina for at least two 
generations? Or as a Robert Mu gabe, whose 
permanent war on colonialism no longer dis-
guises his determination to hang on to rule of 
a failed state by force? Or as another Castro, 
whose perplexing mix of charisma and ruth-
lessness has blocked Cuba’s transition to a 
civil society? None of these possibilities, alas, 
bodes well for Venezuela. 
The grandiosity 
of Chavez’ vision 
and the lack of 
constitutional 
checks on his power 
make it difficult 
to predict how 
Chavez will respond 
to bumps along the 
road — or, for that 
matter, to the cliff 
at the end. 
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